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RISP: An RPKI-Based Inter-AS Source Protection Mechanism
Yihao Jia, Ying Liu, Gang Ren , and Lin He
Abstract: IP source address spoofing is regarded as one of the most prevalent components when launching
an anonymous invasion, especially a Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack. Although Source Address
Validations (SAVs) at the access network level are standardized by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
SAV at the inter-Autonomous System (AS) level still remains an important issue. To prevent routing hijacking, the
IETF is constructing a Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) as a united trust anchor to secure interdomain
routing. In this study, we creatively use the RPKI to support inter-AS SAV and propose an RPKI-based Inter-AS
Source Protection (RISP) mechanism. According to the trust basis provided by the RPKI, RISP offers ASes a more
credible source-oriented protection for the IP addresses they own and remains independent of the RPKI. Based
on the experiments with real Internet topology, RISP not only provides better incentives, but also improves efficacy
and economizes bandwidth with a modest resource consumption.
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1

Introduction

The Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS)[1] attack
is the most prevalent weapon[2] used to destroy
the availability of any Internet-based service[3] . IP
spoofing, which is the most critical dependency of
a DDoS attack, is the core challenge faced by us.
Theoretically, IP spoofing can be divided into two types:
d-DDoS for “d”estination-orientated and s-DDoS for
“s”ource-orientated attacks[4] . The d-DDoS may attack
the target with arbitrary source addresses to simply
remain anonymous, whereas the s-DDoS, which is also
defined as a reflection attack, sends packets with the
target’s source addresses to innocent destination hosts,
whose replies may then flood the target. In most
cases, it is the “source” that suffers the most from IP
spoofing attacks. Taking the network time protocol
based reflection attack in 2014[5] as an example, to
form the 400-Gbps extensive convergence flooding with
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amplifying traffic, it is the source, not the destination
that acts as the assault target. Therefore, the deficiency
of source protection for IP address holders should be the
main reason leading to such reflection scenarios.
The Source Address Validation Architecture
(SAVA)[6] is the most recent and intense research
topic in this field. SAVA divides the mission into
three levels with different granularities: the access
network, intra-Autonomous System (AS), and interAS. The first two levels focus on the validation of
the packets that originate in the AS, whereas the
last level considers the packets originating from
other ASes. Despite standardization at the access
network level[7] is effectively conducted by the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) Source Address
Validation Improvements (SAVI) working group, IP
spoofing cannot be eradicated only by internal defense
methods. Although methods like Ingress/Egress
Filtering (IEF)[8] are cost-effective, it cannot prevent IP
spoofing unless globe deployment. Therefore, inter-AS
SAV is still indispensable against IP spoofing, because
it is the only and last defense to prevent IP spoofing
from outside of an AS according to SAVA architecture.
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)[9] ,
the major trust anchor of the Internet promoted by IETF
Secure InterDomain Routing (SIDR) working group,
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is constructed to solve the problem of authenticity of
routing origination. The first application of RPKI—
Route Origination Authorization (ROA)[10] —naturally
provides a built-in stipulation where ASes can be the
hosts for a given IP prefix. Therefore, we envision
that a data source security for inter-AS SAV will also
indirectly benefit from the RPKI system.
In this study, by probing the substance of RPKI,
we creatively integrated inter-AS SAV into RPKI
and propose RPKI-based Inter-AS Source Protection
(RISP). RISP simplifies the logic of inter-AS SAV by
decoupling its function, making the system focus on the
validation while RPKI focuses on the rest. Through
analysis, such a reciprocal attribute provides inter-AS
SAV a more concise and modularized structure; this
improves the filtering efficiency of traditional methods.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study
that tries to solve inter-AS SAV within the RPKI
architecture. The key contributions of this paper can
be summarized as follows:
(1) Decoupled Structure: RISP is an RPKI-based
and RPKI-decoupled method. RISP adequately
leverages the trust basis provided by RPKI and
works well in the partial deployment of RPKI.
(2) Source-Oriented Protection:
By valuing
“protections” over “validation”, RISP provides
deployer ASes a more credible protection for the
IP addresses they own, triggering decent incentives
for themselves.
(3) Filtering Efficiency: RISP benefits from the
power-law theorem of the Internet to a large extent,
achieving high defensive performance with only a
small deployment rate.
Through mathematical analysis and related
experiments, it is shown that RISP provides deployer
ASes decent incentives with a modest resource
consumption, and improves performance and saves
bandwidth over a typical cryptography-based method.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 describes the related studies. Section 3
describes RISP in detail. Section 4 presents the
evaluation of RISP. Section 5 discusses security issues.
Section 6 provides the conclusions of this study.

2
2.1

Related Studies
Inter-AS SAV

Inter-AS SAV methodologies implemented at Internet
routers can be primarily classified into two types:
routing-based validation and labeling-based validation.

Routing-based validations verify source addresses
by restricting the feasible incoming interfaces for
each IP space according to the routing information.
However, in most cases, routing-based validations
neglect the benefits for deployed ASes themselves,
resulting in weak incentives in deployment. Besides,
in practice, false positives are another challenge
for routing-based methods because of the dynamics
of interdomain routing. A labeling-based validation
usually involves cryptography, and it verifies the source
address using an exclusive customized label. Although
these methods introduce extra cost in validating these
cryptographic labels, they offer the deployers higher
incentives and flexibility even if these ASes are
nonadjacent. Challenges for this method mainly include
the optimizations of the labeling algorithm and key
distribution. In this regard, a labeling-based validation
usually presents a trade-off between flexibility and
complexity.
In this section, we present the main technologies
used for each type of methods to pinpoint both the
characteristics and lessons that should be taken away.
2.1.1 Routing-based validation
Source Address Validity Enforcement (SAVE)[11] , on
the behalf of this type of method, attempts to provide
a new protocol to notify each router the potential
incoming interfaces for each source address space.
However, SAVE only works if it is completely
deployed, lacking mechanisms for partial deployment.
Unlike SAVE that depends on collaboration between
numerous ASes, InterDomain Packet Filters (IDPF)[12]
deployers construct a validation table by individually
backward prediction from BGP update messages.
Although IDPF acts as a classical representative
inheriting the ideology of DPF[13] , the possible false
negatives are one of the main flaws of this method
because of interdomain asymmetry routing.
Another defense technology with a valuable efficacy
is the unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF)[14] .
uRPF utilizes the forwarding table as the filter rules
for source validation, exhibiting a high potency when
deploying at the edge of the Internet. Despite that stubAS occupies more than 85% of the entire interdomain
units[15] , the asymmetrical routing makes it impractical
and unrealistic to deploy at the core of the Internet.
2.1.2 Labeling-based validation
Hop-Count Filtering (HCF)[16] utilizes the Time To
Live (TTL) value as an inherent label of each packet.
On the assumption of HCF, the hops of each two
hosts are relatively stable, therefore the destination
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can easily drop packets carrying an odd TTL value
for a given source. Nevertheless, the TTL value
remains variable due to dynamic routing; this makes
it full of challenging for a traffic crossing domains.
Worse, network intermediate nodes may not inspect the
correctness of a TTL value, thus attackers can modify
the TTL value easily to bypass such a defense.
Spoofing Prevention Mechanism (SPM)[17] is a
typical representative to verify a packet source by its
related label. In the control plane, the ASes that execute
the method negotiate the key privately as the generator
of the label. Then in the data plane, the packet that is
sent to the ASes, who also belongs to the SPM alliance,
would be tagged with an extra label by the key at the
source AS border router and checked at the destination
router. Essentially, SPM is an End-End verification
technology; therefore, the filtering packets merely at
the destination AS mean that the bandwidth can still
be consumed in the interdomain area by the attackers’
invalid flows. Besides, the key negotiation overhead
during the inter-AS area would be colossal once the
SPM is used for a large scale range.
2.2

RPKI overview

RPKI is an infrastructure designed to prevent the
hijacking of inter-AS routing. By accessing the RPKI
system, AS border routers can obtain the legitimate
ASes list for each IP prefix, and then a BGP update
that declares this IP prefix for other ASes would be
considered as a hijack and subsequently dropped by
these routers.
RPKI has two major components: repository and
relying party. On one side, each Internet Number
Resource (INR) holder with AS Numbers (ASNs)
and IP addresses may maintain an isolated repository.
Certificates and objects would be placed in these
repositories. Certificates indicate the ownership of
the INRs, whereas objects describe their usable range.
For routing security, ROA is the object that assigns
the original ASes for each IP prefix. On the other
side, the relying parties in different places of the
world would synchronize the data from all repositories
and verify their validity. Subsequently, verification
materials would be generated to feed routers that are
willing to secure routing.
At present, RPKI has been standardized by more
than dozens of RFCs in “SIDR”, and RPKI-based
innovations such as paper[15] also attract much attention
in both research and industrial fields. Although the
deployment ratio of RPKI has not reached 10% in
five regional Internet registries at the moment, it is
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considered to be the ultimate solution for interdomain
routing security and expected to mature gradually.

3

RISP

As indicated, RPKI provides an anchor for which ASes
can announce the BGP update for a given IP prefix, so
that malicious ASes cannot hijack the IP spaces that
do not belong to them. However, if this scenario is
looked at from another perspective, RPKI offers the
bindings between ASNs and IP prefixes. In other words,
RPKI indicates that the packets using a particular source
address can only be sent from these designated ASes.
In this regard, RPKI may also play an important role in
inter-AS SAV.
This section describes in detail the theory of RISP,
a labeling-based validation method. As learned from
previous studies, inter-AS SAV usually involves a tradeoff between flexibility and complexity. Therefore,
at the end of this section, it is explained how RISP
achieves decent incentives by valuing “protection” over
“validation”, and why RISP achieves a more reasonable
balance compared to other methods. For conciseness,
we denote the AS that enables RISP by RAS; the set of
RASes is denoted by RISP alliance and the legacy ASes
are denoted by LAS hereafter.
3.1

Architecture

Figure 1 shows the decoupled design of RISP. In such an
architecture, both the RPKI repository and relying party
play the same role as that in routing security, whereas
a logically centralized but practically distributed
center—RISP Alliance Center (RAC)—is introduced
in the interdomain area. Besides, an RISP server is
required for each RAS. Border routers of these RASes
should also be equipped with modules that support
inter-AS SAV.
Basically, each RISP server of the RAS would
register a symmetric key to RACs and install it in all
border routers, and then for the traffic that originates
to and from the AS, labels would be tagged on these
packets using such symmetric keys. By combining
the data from RPKI and RISP servers, a validation
rule would be formed in RACs. Subsequently, border
RISP alliance centers

RISP server

RPKI relying party
RPKI repositories

AS
AS border router

Fig. 1

RISP architecture.
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routers of the RASes would adopt the rule to detect
inter-AS spoofing by validating the packet carrying the
labels, i.e., RAC, on one hand, acts as a service provider
of inter-AS SAV, feeding RASes border routers on the
validation rule to prevent spoofing; on the other hand,
similar to a normal client of the RPKI system, the RAC
absorbs the essential data from the relying parties to
generate the rule. Foundational functions of these new
entities are described below.
3.1.1 RISP server
An RISP server is more like a controller in each
deployed AS. On one side, it connects to all the border
routers of the RAS to install the basic configuration and
symmetric key. On the other side, it registers with the
RACs to declare the symmetric key that the AS uses. In
addition, such functions can be supported by the RISP
server if a reregistration is needed due to some security
emergency.
3.1.2 RAC
The logically centralized RAC is regarded as the key
distribution platform. In practice, similar to the roots
of DNS, mirroring of the RAC is advised to reduce
potential single point failure. Figure 2 shows the logical
structure of the RAC. Two major materials are pulled
from the RPKI relying party: “IP-ASN” mapping and
“RPKI router public key”. The access control module
would use the public key to guarantee the security of
communication, while both “IP-ASN” mapping and
the registration data would be combined to create the
validation rule of RISP. Border routers that belong to
the RASes would be authorized to access the rule and
prevent spoofing.
3.1.3 RAS border router
Both RISP server and RAC would feed the border
router to support the RISP validation. Figure 3 shows
the structure of the RAS border router. The RISP
server would install a symmetric key and local IP space
on the border routers; the label engine can tag the
packets and source differentiator can distinguish the
traffic according to them. The RAC would provide
routers with the validation rule, so that the spoofing

traffic that uses the source address belonging to RASes
would be filtered.
3.2

Control plane design

Primarily, RPKI implementation was assumed as the
preparation of the RISP deployers, i.e., as a prerequisite,
the IP address and ASN holders of RASes should issue
the ROAs and RPKI router certificates at their own or
upper repositories. Each RISP server of the RAS would
register a symmetric key at the RAC, and an “ASNsymmetric key” list will be generated at the registration
module of RAC. By combining the mapping of “IPASN” and “ASN-symmetric key” using “ASN” as the
associated key, a table of “IP-ASN-symmetric key”, as
shown in Fig. 4, is available at the RAC as the validation
rule of RISP. The registration information should be
synced among different mirrors of the RAC, so that the
RISP servers can register to the nearest mirror. Finally,
the RAS border routers would periodically fetch the
RISP validation rule from the nearest mirror of the
RAC.
Notably, the IP address pertaining the ROA may
refer to a variable length of the IP prefix, rather than
a fixed length. Although the flexible IP prefix length
can prevent hijacking, which “benefits” from the rule
of longest prefix matched routing, inter-AS SAV still
should protect the IP space of a given AS to the
maximum possible extent. Therefore, the combination
of two such maps should use the minimum length of the
IP prefix for a larger protection space of each RAS.
Besides, to secure the communication of registration
and validation rule fetch, a Transport Layer Security
(TLS) session with advanced encryption and bilateral
identity verification is indispensable for protecting the
data from interception. For the identity authentication

Symmetric Key

RPKI router public key

Label Engine

Registration
module
RISP Server

Fig. 2

RAC structure.

Validation rule
Cache
AS border router

RISP Validation Engine

RAS Border Router

RAS border router structure.

IP-ASN mapping

Validation rule
generator

RISP Validation Rule

Source differentiator

Fig. 3

Database

RISP
Alliance Center

Local IP Space
Database

RPKI Relying Party
Access control

RISP Alliance Center

RISP Server

RISP Validation Rule
IP

ASN

Symmetric Key

37.12.*.*/16

13 122

d42b2f1a3b12…

2001:2f35:*/48

370

1d43f1a3b25c…

…

…

…

Fig. 4

RISP validation rule.
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of the RAC, an RISP root certificate can either be
released from an out-band method or preset at the RAS
border routers operation system. For registration, RISP
servers should provide the signature so that the RAC
can reject the invalid ASes based on the “RPKI router
public key”. For validation rule fetch, the RAC should
first identify the AS border routers based on the “RPKI
router public key”, and subsequently check whether the
AS they belong to has registered in the RISP alliance as
an RAS. Only AS border routers with an RPKI router
certificate and belong to a registered RAS can fetch the
rule.
3.3

Data plane design

The data plane logic, as shown in Fig. 5, can be divided
into two parts: one for the inflowing traffic, and the
other for the outflowing traffic. Notably, it is assumed
that all the border routers of the RASes have completed
all processes of the control plane described above.
3.3.1

Basic ingress filtering

Inflowing traffic using the source address of deployed
ASes themselves should be filtered out. For basic
ingress filtering, RAS border routers should inspect the
source address of all inflowing traffic and drop those
using their own address as the source. Considering that
there is no reason why the packets belonging to this AS
would originate from others, the inflowing traffic with
its own source address can be undoubtedly regarded as
IP spoofing.
3.3.2

Labeling

For traffic outflowing from the RASes, RAS border
routers should label the packets with source address
belonging to their own AS. Considering that RASes
already execute the basic ingress filtering at first,
packets with the source address of themselves must
Outflowing Traﬃc

Yes

Inflowing Traﬃc

Source
differentiator

No

Source
differentiator
Src ∈ this AS ?

Src ∈ this AS ?
Label
Engine

Src ∈ RISP
alliance?

Filtering

Label attached?

Filtering

RISP Validation Engine
Pass validation?

Forwarding Engine

Fig. 5

Forwarding Engine

Processing logic for data plane traffic.
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come from their own users or devices. The content of
the label is an exclusive Message Authentication Code
(MAC) calculated by the symmetric key owned by the
RAS. Such labels would be carried in an extension field
of the IP header and treated as the identifier of the
packet validity.
3.3.3

Validation

Besides, for inflowing traffic using the RASes’ source
address, validity can be identified by the labels carried
by these packets. Packets carrying no labels can only
be sent from spoofed senders and should be directly
filtered out. According to the validation rule obtained
from the control plane, the MAC sequence can be
calculated by the validation engine. Traffic whose
label is inconsistent with the calculation result can be
regarded as spoofing, and hence, must be dropped.
3.4

Label design

According to the design of the label, three details should
be defined clearly in practical realization.
3.4.1

Labeling extension field

The design of the extension field in IPv4 and IPv6 is
quite different. For all the fields in the header of IPv4,
referencing the scheme of previous studies such as
SPM, “Identification” (16-bit), and “Fragment Offset”
(13-bit) could be the most suitable ones for sequence
rewriting. First, they are immutable during routing, i.e.,
the sequence of these fields would not change when
passing through the routers that forwarded the packets.
Moreover, only about 0.06% of the packets on the
Internet are truly fragmented[18] ; hence, such collateral
damages may be worthy because damages from IP
spoofing may surpass those caused by fragmenting. In
addition, considering that compatibility with IPv4 will
no longer be the focus of the IETF[19] , such a collateral
damage could be another incentive for IPv6 migration.
For IPv6, owing to the great scalability supported
by the IPv6 extension header, any new semantic for IP
layer could be presented in a more logical way with a
high compatibility. To find a field that satisfies inter-AS
SAV the best, we propose an exclusive “RISP extension
header” that can only be recognized by RAS border
routers at interdomain areas. As the IETF suggests, an
assumption should be made that the extension header
is automatically ignored by intermediate devices that
do not recognize it, including receivers. Besides, the
extra 8 bytes introduced by the extension header may
exceed the IPv6 Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU)
of the external link negotiated before; hence, the border
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router should announce a new MTU value that is 8 bytes
smaller than the “packet too big” ICMPv6 message.
3.4.2

Labeling algorithm

The algorithm used to calculate the MAC sequence can
be flexibly substituted if a more advanced or efficient
method is available. In this paper, we recommend
the widely acknowledged AES-CMAC algorithm[20] :
cmac=AES-CMAC(key, msg) owing to its high security
and extensive high-speed hardware implementations.
The msg is the bit sequence with a fixed field of
the original header that would not change during the
interdomain forwarding, and we recommend the source
and destination address as the msg as the trade-off
between security and efficiency. Considering that it
is authenticity rather than confidentiality that RISP
focuses on, the truncation from 128-bit to 32-bit (IPv6)
or 29-bit (IPv4) is acceptable for the RISP system to
lower the bandwidth occupation.
3.4.3

Key update

Notice that RISP requires RASes to refresh the
key periodically to maintain security.
Therefore,
a cryptography-secure pseudo-random number
generation algorithm[21] could be used to further
reduce the complexity of the key update step. Then,
to realize such an auto-update, the seed, update
algorithm, issue time, updating cycle, expiration time,
and calculation algorithm should be stated clearly
during the registration for each RAS, and the update
could be conducted at RASes locally to reduce the
communication burden on RACs. Besides, once a rule
is stolen, a key reregistration is needed to resecure
the system. Each time a reregistration is submitted
to RACs, a notice must be sent to all RASes’ RISP
servers, and the RISP servers would inform all their
border routers to reload the rule from the nearest RAC.
It is emphasized that, to remove potential false positives
during updating, periodic time synchronization among
RACs is necessary to avoid any inconsistency, and for
each RAS, a buffer time is indispensable before and
after the key update.
3.5

Property summary

Before moving to the evaluation, we briefly describe a
few advantageous properties that RISP possesses.
3.5.1

RPKI decoupling

Architecturally, RPKI can support the interdomain
security of both routing and SAV. For inter-AS routing,
RPKI remains the same as its original design, whereas

for inter-AS SAV, RPKI is a part of the RISP and helps
RACs produce the validation rule. In this regard, RISP
can be regarded as a potential power user of RPKI
under such a decoupled structure. Besides, multiplexing
the already existing trust anchor allows RISP to avoid
potential redundancy, and such a relationship between
RPKI and RISP could also be considered as an
accelerator to stimulate RPKI’s deployment, which
may, in turn, promote a positive cycle of the deployment
of other security facilities at the inter-AS level.
3.5.2

Source-oriented protection

For an individual AS, spoofing defense has been treated
as “protection”, and hence, the primary concern of
these deployed ASes is to what extent the mechanism
can prevent addresses belonging to oneself being used
by others. Therefore, RISP is highly designed as
a “source-oriented” method to provide deployers the
capability against potential s-DDoS attack involving
reflection. Therefore, such a source-oriented defense
makes RISP more like a “protection” mechanism, rather
than a “validation” mechanism. In this regard, RISP can
provide deployers more incentives for deploying this
method.
3.5.3

On-path filtering

RISP could be regarded as the complementation of
both “labeling” and “routing” based methods, with the
advantages of each method. Unlike general “labelingbased” methods that filter packets at destination ASes,
RISP changes the checking position to intermediate
ASes during packet forwarding, reducing the burden
of bandwidth and the possibility of attack convergence.
In this regard, RISP makes a more “routing-based”
approach; however, the cryptography-based labeling
helps it avoid the intrinsic false positives of those
mechanisms.

4

Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate RISP by “deployment
incentives”, performance, overhead, and false positives.
Most importantly, because we focus on the interAS scenario, as indicated earlier, methods that
overemphasize the filtering effect usually ignore the
incentives for AS deployers, and severely degrade
the deployability for its practical implementation.
In this regard, we consider “deployment incentives”
as the most important and practical criterion for
our evaluation. After that, to explore whether RISP
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can provide good efficacy and a low error rate at
reasonable costs, we studied the overall filtering
performance, overheads, and false positives consulted
from Ref. [22]. “Performance” is an empirically crucial
criterion because it presents the effectiveness of IP
spoofing prevention. Also, “overhead” is vital as well
because it potentially affects, the feasibility whether a
method can be practically accepted and implemented.
Besides, notably ASes, in general, tend to provide the
optimal service quality, and hence, methods with “false
positives” are not allowed in practice.
To clearly elucidate the evaluation, we took the
“incentive” metric as an elaborate example in the first
evaluation part to disclose the theories adopted in
these experiments. Evaluations of the performance
obey the same model. Besides, because SPM is
presented as a typical cryptography and labeling based
method, we introduce it as the comparison in the
analysis regarding the similar filtering mechanism and
compatible assessment model consulted from Ref. [4].
For conciseness, we denoted the universal set of all the
existing ASes by N and the set of all RASes by M with
the number of n and m, respectively.
4.1
4.1.1

Deployment incentive
Mathematical analysis

The deployment incentive, which quantizes the desire
of an LAS to be an RAS, is defined as the benefit
of this implementing. Theoretically, we quantified the
benefit as the “protection” they will gain in view of
the reflection DDoS attack, i.e., whether the LAS can
prevent their own IP addresses from being used by
others.
Let spf(s; d; v/ depict the spoofed traffic that
originates from a source AS s to a destination AS
d , taking IP addresses belonging to the victim AS v.
Denoted by F fM; spf.s; d; v/g, the result of whether
AS v could be immune from a specific spf.s; d; v/
under the protection of(M , is given as follows:
1; if M can filter spf.s; d; v/I
F fM; spf.s; d; v/g D
0; otherwise:
Defining ı D fM; spf.s; d; v/g as the benefits of
the AS v’s transformation from LAS to RAS,
ı D F fM [ fvg; spf.s; d; v/g F fM; spf.s; d; v/g:
Because validation is executed for IP addresses
belonging to RASes, an LAS cannot receive
any protection from the RISP alliance M , i.e., F fM;

7

spf.s; d; v/g D 0. Thus, ı D F fM [ fvg; spf.s; d; v/g.
Hence ı D 1 indicates that an LAS can benefit from the
protection of a potential s-DDoS attack by deploying
RISP, and ı D 0 indicates that the LAS cannot filter
such spf.s; d; v/ by turning into an RAS.
piS , piD , and piV are the independent probabilities of
an AS i being the source AS, destination AS, or the
victim AS, respectively, where 8i , 0 6 piS ; piD ; piV 6
P
P D
P V
1, i piS D
i pi D
i pi D 1. Let inc.M; v/
depict the incentives for an LAS v’s transformation to
RAS, so that the value of inc.M; v/ can be derived as
ı’s weighted accumulation:
X
inc.M; v/ D
piS pjD .M; spf.s; d; v//:
i;j

route.s; d / is the AS sequence that spf.s; d; v/ would
be forwarded. Then, as the RISP mechanism executes,
filtering would work at the first RAS in route.s; d /,
and spoofing traffic spf.s; d; v/ can be filtered if v 2
RAS and route.s; d / \ M ¤ ;. Therefore, ı D
fM; spf.s; d; v/g D 1 if route.s; d / \ fM [ fvgg ¤ ;,
then inc.M; v/ can be further defined as:
X
inc.M; v/ D
piS pjD :
route.i;j /\fM [fvgg¤;

As the expression inc.M; v/ indicated, the value of
inc.M; v/ monotonically increases as m increases, i.e.,
if M1  M2 , then inc.M1 ; v/ < inc.M2 ; v/. In brief,
if more LASes become RASes, the value of m would
increase. In this case, the higher is the possibility
of spf.s; d; v/ transmitted by an RAS. Therefore, the
benefits of RISP snowball for both RASes and the
LASes deploying the technology.
To further express inc.M; v/, traffic volume that
is sent by (and to) each of the AS must be
counted to imitate the real Internet environment.
Unfortunately, the data described here are difficult
to obtain. To approximate a real environment as
much as possible, we adopt the widely applied
“address equivalence” hypothesis in this research
field. The address equivalence hypothesis assumes
that the traffic shuttling from arbitrary IP addresses
is undiscriminating, indicating that the traffic volume
from different ASes is proportional to the address space
they own. Under such assumptions, every routable
address has the same probability of being the source,
destination, and victim. Although this assumption is
just an approximation, it is enough to appraise the
efficacy of these methods to a certain extent.
To embody inc.M; v/ in the address equivalence
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4.1.2

Experiments and datasets

To verify the above theory, we measured the metric
under different deployment ratios. Initially, we let
M D ;, and at each time point we randomly selected
an LAS in M and calculated the incentives at this
sampling point until all ASes were in M (random
mode). We used the topology of the entire Internet with
AS relationships from the CAIDA “AS Relationships”
dataset on “2016-05-01”[23] , and used the IP Mapping
prefix-ASN from the CAIDA database “RouteViews
Prefix to AS Mappings” from the same date[24] .
Meanwhile, we used C-BGP[25] as a sophisticated
simulator to find the route for any two ASes in the
interdomain area.
4.1.3

Deployment strategy

Another question facing the implementation of this
practice is that AS should be the initial RAS during
the early stage of deployment. Because RISP filters
packets during forwarding, the more important an AS
in interdomain traffic transiting is, the more prominent
it will be in the RISP system. Therefore, a crucial
breakout for this question is to establish the AS that acts
in this important role in interdomain traffic transiting.
Fortunately, the AS transit degree[26] proposed
in Ref. [27] as a key metric for AS relationship
detection embodies the characteristics sought by us. To
recapitulate it in brief, the AS transit degree depicts the
number of ASes that were observed receiving transit
paths through a given AS. Therefore, in the second
experiment, we always selected the LAS with the
largest transit degree, instead of the random LAS, as
our “Optimal” strategy.

4.1.4

Results analysis

According to the results shown in Fig. 6, inc.M; v/
is indeed a monotonic increasing function. Compared
to the traditional cryptography method—SPM with a
similar mathematical theory, it is reliable that RISP does
go further in providing a better incentive. Theoretically,
for spf.s; d; v/ that v 2 M , SPM can only filter packets
for which d 2 M , whereas RISP works once it flows
through M . Therefore, the incentives of RISP will
always exceed those in SPM within the same deployer
set M . By concurrently drawing the SPM incentives
at each sampling point, we find that although SPM
obviously benefits from the “Optimal” selection mode,
RISP may provide overwhelming superiority against
this method in both the selection modes.
Besides, the results show that the incentives shown
in Fig. 6b burst rapidly at the early deployment stage
with more than 90% and 98% under only 61 and 120
deployers. In other words, almost all potential s-DDoS
attacks that aim at an LAS, at such a sampling point,
will be eliminated once an LAS uses RISP, i.e., RISP
benefits from the power-law theorem of the Internet[28] ,
and the extremely high initial incentives may trigger a
virtuous circle if RASes are strategically selected.
4.2

Performance study

Based on the same mathematical theory and evaluation

Deployment incentives

hypothesis, we present the metric from a statistical
angle. Let g.x/ denote the routable address space of
ASx ; then for a specific source ASs , spoofed traffic
that employs v’s addresses could be aimed at n 1
destinations. Thus, the aggregate spoofed flows from
P
ASs could be assumed to be  D g.s/ d ¤s g.d /.
RISP can filter the traffic routing through M ; hence,
flows that could be filtered can be expressed as  D
P
g.s/ route.s; d /\M ¤; g.d /. Therefore, total incentives
inc.M; v/ from RISP could be formalized as the
weighted average of = as below:


P
P
s2N g.s/
route.s; d /\M ¤; g.d /


inc.M; v/ D
:
P
P
g.s/
g.d
/
s2N
d ¤s
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(a) Whole deployment process
Fig. 6

Incentives along deployment.
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Bandwidth economy

Efficacy improvement

To find the amount of progress that has been made
by using RISP, we computed the ratio of the spoofed
traffic reduction between RISP and SPM under the
unified deployment set. Figure 7b shows that RISP
has a greater filtering capability than SPM in both
the modes. However, an interesting phenomenon
was observed: The progress in the “Optimal” mode
is slightly lower than that in the “Random” mode.
This is probably because the “Optimal” mode provides
stronger performance improvements for SPM as well
and narrows the gap between it and RISP.
4.2.3

0

Effectiveness

Figure 7a shows the global efficacy in IP spoofing
prevention. Similar to our observations on the
“incentive”, the effectiveness of RISP surpasses that of
SPM in both the “Random” and “Optimal” modes. In
this regard, more spoofing traffic will be filtered in RISP
under the unified deployment set. More importantly,
according to the results in Fig. 7a, RISP filters out more
than 70% of spoofed traffic with only 7% deployment
in the “Optimal” mode, exhibiting a strong defense
performance for the entire community.
4.2.2

1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2

Progress

4.2.1

Global spooﬁng reduction

model mentioned above, we studied the RISP’s overall
capability in preventing IP spoofing at the interAS level. In this subsection, we first simulated
the filtering efficacy by drawing the proportion of
global spoofing reduction.
Then, by contrasting
with the representative SPM, we show that RISP
clearly improves the performance improvement and
economizes the bandwidth.

Bandwidth economization

Another advantage of RISP is the improved bandwidth
economy “borrowing” from the routing-based method.
Unlike the spoofed traffic, which can only be filtered at
the destination ASes under SPM, RISP filters packets
on intermediate ASes as packets pass by. Therefore,
even traffic that can be filtered effectively by SPM can
be dropped earlier under the RISP system. To simulate
the process economizing bandwidth, we simply extract
the inter-AS hop count of the packets before they are
filtered as an abstraction of the bandwidth utility.
As shown in Fig. 7c, the bandwidth economy
improves as the number of deployers increases,
reaching 68% in a global deployment scenario. While
under the “Optimal” selection model, the value surges
to 50% with only 500 RASes; more than half of the
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Fig. 7 a) Effectiveness;
(c)Bandwidth economizing.

1.0

(b) Efficacy improvement;

ASes should deploy RISP to achieve the equivalent
performance with the “Random” model. Thus, RISP
provides a dramatic bandwidth economy improvement
compared to SPM, with rapid convergence if the
“Optimal” model is executed.
4.3

Overhead

In this section, we estimate the overhead of RISP in both
the control and data planes. In the control plane, the
overhead cost mainly stems from the key distribution,
while in the data plane, the overhead cost mainly stems
from cryptography computation.
4.3.1

Key distribution

For a practical implementation, the biggest problem for
SPM is the tremendous key negotiation overhead that
increases along with the number of deployers.
Traditional key negotiation distributes the keys in a
bilateral way, i.e., the overhead in that way would be
o.m2 /. Unlike the traditional bilateral key negotiation,
RISP deployers submit the keys to the logical center—
RAC, and RAC acts as a unique key distribution
platform for all deployers. Thus, the overhead of RISP
for the control plane would be decreased from o.m2 / to
o.m/. Considering that the key rollover can be updated
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periodically at local RASes automatically, the overhead
of RISP is acceptable for practical deployment.
Attention should be paid to the fact that the unitive
key distribution platform cannot provide equal security
as the bilateral platform, and we regard it as the result
of a trade-off between security and complexity. The
security issues will be intensively discussed in the next
section.
4.3.2

Cryptography computation

For the data plane, the overhead of RISP may stem
from a table lookup and cryptography computation.
Although packets belonging to LASes would not
require any validation during interdomain forwarding,
we focused on the validation computation to explore
whether it would become a bottleneck practically. As
indicated above, the cost of computation highly depends
on the algorithm used, but we still evaluated that for
AES-CMAC to explain the feasibility of cryptography.
Owing to the high-speed hardware utilization of AESCMAC, the implementations on ASIC and FPGA can
already handle a maximum traffic throughput of around
2 Gbps per IP core[29] . Therefore, the throughput of
tens of gigabits per second in the interdomain area
is completely acceptable in view of the benefit they
receive.
In addition, notably if we adopt the “Optimal”
deployment model at this early stage, it may not
be easy for RASes with a greater transit degree
because of the huge traffic they transmit. Although
the overhead of RISP is strictly limited in the above
range, it is proportional to the traffic volume processed.
Considering that ASes, especially that in Tier-1, are
more likely to forward traffic of hundreds of gigabits per
second, more hardware should be updated in supporting
such a huge traffic they deliver.
4.4

False positives analysis

According to the filtering logic, the false positives of
RISP can stem from the inconsistency of the validation
rule. To avoid this inconsistency, we recommend
reserving a one-minute time buffer in practice after the
key rollover and key reregistration. Each time the key
update is triggered, previous keys should be considered
as valid during the buffer time zone. Besides, especially
for key reregistration, new keys can be used only after
that time zone. However, implementation in practice
may have some instability caused by the practical
situation, and the buffer time could be extended in the

case of errors such as delays among different RAC
mirrors.

5

Security Issues

This section analyzes three potential threats that RISP
may face. For these threats, possible solutions or
advices are proposed to narrow these attack spaces. To
ensure a high-level security, AS reputation systems such
as system in Ref. [30] could be introduced to dislodge
maliciously deployed ASes. However, without the loss
of generality, it is assumed that RASes that joined the
RISP alliance would strictly observe the regulation of
the design, and the operations of RPKI are stable as
desired.
5.1

DDoS attacking

Although massive DDoS attacks can be significantly
weakened if the source addresses are difficult to spoof
due to the implementation of RISP, attacks that use
a genuine source address from a gradually growing
number of IoT devices may still be able to degrade the
defense system to a certain degree.
5.1.1 RPKI orientated
DDoS attacks that aim at a relying party may not
cause trouble because the “users” of RPKI may be
configured with several alternatives; hence, the RAC
can be quickly switched to a backup if the primary one
is interrupted. Besides, DDoS attacks may also aim at
RPKI repositories and their inner policies. However,
the policies prepared for interdomain area are relatively
stable in view of a downtime period.
5.1.2 RAC orientated
RACs may not be absolutely safe, even though a mirror
technology is introduced in the RISP system. DDoS
mitigation methods such as BGP Anycast may work
to reduce the attacking space, and the security policy
should be further considered during its realization.
Fortunately, studies in the DDoS mitigation area are
continuously active; technologies such as methods in
Ref. [31] can be gradually introduced to defend against
such attacks.
5.1.3 RAS orientated
Attackers may attempt to overwhelm the border
routers of the target RAS with massive spurious
labels, and networks may crash once the computation
consumption is not affordable during the malicious
flooding. However, it is easier for border routers to
selectively pause the validation once the computation
resources are completely depleted. Hence, DDoS
attacks aiming at RASes still remain challenging.
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5.2

Rule interception

Theoretically, communications involving RAC are
all equipped with advanced encryption and bilateral
authentication. Therefore, rule interception during
communications is more about a practice problem,
rather than a design issue. Besides, attackers may
attempt to compromise the RAS border routers to steal
the rule. To defend against such threats, border routers
that enable RISP should be installed with strict security
policy to protect themselves against such an invasion.
Besides, a global rule update is obligatory once the rule
is intercepted.
5.3

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

Brute force

The brute-force label forgery attack is expected to
succeed in guessing the correct symmetric key after 231
(IPv6) or 228 (IPv4) attempts, therefore, a theoretically
spoofed traffic may survive during the rekey period.
However, the cost of such an attack seems prohibitive
for most invasions. Attackers can be easily frustrated
by expanding the bit sequence of the identifier label or
simply by reducing the period of key rollover.

6

[3]

Conclusion

In this paper, we proposed an inter-AS SAV
mechanism: RISP as a new application of RPKI.
Architecturally, RISP adequately leverages the trust
basis provided by RPKI and works well in RPKI’s
partial deployment. According to the source-oriented
validation, RISP offers ASes a more credible protection
for IP addresses they own, triggering decent incentives
and increasing defense efficacy.
Based on the
experiments with real Internet topology, RISP avoids
inherent false positives as well as relieves the burden
of bandwidth with modest resource consumption.
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